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Law, Literature and Intertextuality
Abstract. Most of the contemporary scholarships of both literature and law categorize the coincidences and 
overlaps between an author’s literary work and his or her legal career, a given literary period and the same 
historical era of law and jurisprudence or between innumerable pieces of literature and the texts of the law merely 
as things of no real interest, curious facts that are not worthy of detailed academic analysis. While a point of view 
of this kind has its reasons the aim of the following paper is to change this attitude to a certain extent. In my 
opinion instead of talking about the “death of law and literature” we should consider the possibilites of (re)opening 
new ways of research for law and literature studies that may provide mutual benefits to both the representatives of 
legal and literary sciences. Hereinafter I will try to show why and how exploring the intertextual connections 
between the texts of law and those of literature seems to me the most fruitful endeavour to connect law and 
literature to each other.
Keywords: law and literature, interdisciplinarity, intertextuality, law as intertext, critique of contemporary 
jurisprudence and literary criticism, Dostoevsky, Kafka, Kleist, Hajnóczy, Cover, Ferguson, Ziolkowski
“In the last analysis, everything that happens to writers– 
good or bad–forms a part of their literary destiny 
(and they have no other). Tout est á boutir á un livre, 
says Mallarmé. Everything in the world exists to be turned into a book.”
Danilo Kis1
Introduction
Kleist, Hoffman and the Allgemeines Landrecht, Heine, Stendhal and the Code Napoleon, 
Dostoyevsky and the 1864 Russian legislation, Kafka and the Strafgesetz from 1852, the 
Penal Code of Austria-Hungary. Authors, their works and modern legal history’s texts of 
privileged status. Codes that–by fate or accident–have made it into the text of a writing or 
in some cases, an entire life’s work, the reception of which, however, has gone by without 
much attention being paid to the significance and the meaning of these connections either 
by literary or by legal scholarship.
Just consider the above-mentioned examples: the remark of Stendhal, that in the course 
of writing The Charterhouse of Parma he read the Code Napoleon each morning to make 
sure that the novel’s style could stay “sufficiently dry and objective”,2 is well known as a 
sort of bon mot, just as it is well known of Hoffman that he was a high court judge, or that 
Kleist, Heine and Dostoyevsky were committed supporters of the codifications of their era. 
* Associate professor, University of Szeged Law School, H-6722 Szeged, Rákóczi tér 1. 
E-mail: nagyt@juris.u-szeged.hu 
Author’s note: I am more than grateful to my friend and colleague Prof. Olivia Radics–pronounced as 
[ɾɒdiʧ]–(University of Baltimore School of Law) without whose invaluable help this text could have 
never (never ever, no chance) been ready in time (see: deadlines).
1 Kiš, D.: Introduction to The Anatomy Lesson. Trans. R. Manheim. In: Homo poeticus: essays 
and interviews. Manchester, 1996. 11.
2 Babits, M.: Az európai irodalom története (reprint) [History of European Literature]. 
Budapest, 1991. 495.
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And just as with regards to Dostoyevsky it is almost always mentioned that he was to suffer 
the processes of the Russian criminal justice system, up until the last minute mitigation of 
his death sentence to one of forced labor, so the Kafka-reception’s pieces don’t fail to 
mention either that the author’s days were filled with legal work performed as a functionary 
of the Worker’s Accident Insurance Institute for the Kingdom of Bohemia in Prague.
So many historical facts, biographical and sociographical details which might serve as 
starting points for drawing suspicions and assumptions with regards to the nature of the 
relationship between the texts and the worlds of literature and law (whatever these latter 
words might in fact mean), but in and of themselves are hardly capable of anything more: 
we cannot draw more audacious conclusions merely from these circumstances. Accordingly, 
the contemporary scholarships of both literature and law categorize the coincidences and 
overlaps between the author’s literary work and his or her legal career, a given literary 
period and the same historical era of law and jurisprudence or–and let’s draw our attention 
primarily to this for the purposes of the present writing–between innumerable pieces of 
literature and the texts of the law, as they appear in the codes, judicial decisions and other 
legal documents, merely as things of no real interest, curious facts that are not worthy of 
detailed academic analysis.
1. What is wrong with these scholarships?–actually, nothing, just
The aversion and distance of literary scholarship is understandable. Modern literary theory 
and criticism, as opposed to the positivist approach of comte-ian origin, championed by 
Hyppolite Taine, has, throughout the 20th century, gradually and ever so vigorously refused 
to apply the kind of interpretation of literary texts that have reference to the so-called 
‘reality’. In today’s literary discourse, any and all interpretations treating the text as a 
derivation of the author’s biography or psychology (the taine-ian la race, le milieu et le 
moment3) or intention seem irredeemably obsolete.
Nevertheless what is surprising: those approaches that insist on the suspension of 
referential interpretation and instead opt for a (close) textual analysis of literature, and the 
intertextual analyses fueled by the theoretical energies of these, seem to accept only in 
exceptional cases the validity of law’s texts as intertexts in the course of the interpretation 
of literary works.4 On occasion postmodern literary scholarship may provide 
counterexamples–what’s more, has even gone as far as asking the more general question of 
whether there is an irrelevant context in the course of the interpretation of literary texts5–, 
3 Taine, H. A.: Introduction to the History of English Literature. In: Eliot, C. W. (ed.): Prefaces 
and Prologues to Famous Books. Charleston (SC), 2007. 412.
4 For a review of the basic literary principles of the theory of intertextuality the Hungarian 
reader might want to see the thematic issue of Helikon periodical. Intertextualitás. [Intertextuality] 
Helikon, 42 (1996) 1–2. Otherwise for a general overview see: Allen, G.: Intertextuality. London–
New York, 2000.
5 Szilasi, L.: Nyakvers (irodalmilag releváns kontextus-e az angol jog?) [Neckverse (is English 
law a relevant context from a literary perspective?)] In: Miért engedjük át az ácsnak az építkezés 
örömét [Why let the carpenter have the joy of building operations]. Budapest, 1994. 57–67. In this 
work Szilasi interprets the last poem of Bálint Balassi, the psalm translated on his death bed, starting 
with the words Ah Deus immensum clemens miserere perecantis, in a new light, using the context of 
the English legal custom–of which a central moment was the reading out aloud of this particular 
psalm–that provided for the possible avoidance of the execution of the death penalty in certain cases. 
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but despite this, the written and spoken (or put down as spoken: witness statements, victim 
reports, oral pleadings/requests etc.) language of the law usually stays outside the realms of 
intertextuality. In the background of this denial there stands the following conviction: the 
representatives of literary studies with regards to the interpretation of literary texts treat 
with suspicion–and often with good reason–any approach to the realm of literature that tries 
to apply “outside” viewpoints and the value judgments included therein. Opposing such 
types of analysis, Milan Kundera said that they tear away the studied texts (Kundera of 
course refers primarily to novels, but his statements can be applied to other types of literary 
genres as well) from the “large context of literary history” and thus degenerate the act of 
interpretation into cheap (biographical, psychological, political, theological and so on) 
explanation or in the words of the Czech author: “kafkology”.6
I find that this approach somewhat limits the range of intertextual research, as it 
hinders the recognition that literary and legal texts can often enter into a fruitful dialogue 
that is often laden with new meanings.
With regards to Kundera’s statement (and actually contrary to it), I believe not only 
that through intertextual investigation certain episodes of legal history may fit into the web 
of the grand connections of literary history, but also that this sort of dialogue’s mutual–that 
is, it can be enjoyed both by literary and by legal scholarship–benefit appears where we 
don’t expect it beforehand. Not only is this true of those works (and their interpretations) 
where the role of the interplay between legal and literary texts in the process of creating 
aesthetic experience and meaning is apparent right away (let’s just recall Michel Foucault’s 
remark that Greek drama can be read as the theatrical version of Greek legal history7), but 
also in the case of those where the mechanisms of text connections take more invisible 
forms; where the catharsis- and meaning-creation works in somewhat more mysterious 
textual ways.
The presence of legal themes (the portrayal of the legal profession, the justice system 
and certain legal problems) or the unraveling of the possible opinions of the authors with 
regards to the law, the legal system and its questions should not signify the ending point of 
those interpretation possibilities that include a legal viewpoint. I find those types of analysis 
that try to show how a legal text may influence the formation of the text (the narrative 
structure, plotline, style, choice of words, sentence structure etc.) of a piece of literary 
As Szilasi says: “the guilty literate is saved from death through his ability to read that what is written”. 
The more general question is similarly fundamental for law and literature studies as well, namely 
whether literary and legal texts can form an intelligent context for each other, whether the study of 
texts in one group can be of benefit to the interpretation of texts in the other group.
6 See Kundera, M.: The Castrating Shadow of Saint Garta. Trans. Linda Asher. In: Testaments 
Betrayed. An Essay in Nine Parts. New York, 1996. 42–44.
7 As Foucault says Oedipus the King is “a kind of compendium of the history of Greek law”. He 
reads certain dramas by Sophocles, especially the Antigone and the Electra, as a sort of theatrical 
ritualization of legal history. In his interpretation what we see here is the most important moment of 
the spreading of Greek democracy summarized in a dramatic form: the story of the process through 
which the people acquire the right to judgement and to provide justice and can turn this against those 
who had previously disposed of this right. For more on this see Foucault, M.: Truth and Juridical 
Forms. Trans. Robert Hurley et al. In: Power (The Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984. Vol. 3.) 
New York, 2000. 17–33. Another great example of a similar analysis can be found in: Simon A.: A 
törvény Szophoklész Antigonéjában [The law in Sophocles’ Antigone]. Iustum Aequum Salutare 3 
(2007) 2, 71–93.
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fiction, or in other words, how it becomes part of the poetical tools operating the text in 
question, and how and to what extent it determines the process of interpretation, an entire 
valid area of research. Solely for the purposes of illustration–without any sort of analysis–
let me mention a few obvious examples.
On the stories of Heinrich von Kleist–both with regards to style and structure–a visible 
influence can be detected, formed by those Landrecht style handbooks that strictly 
determined the language use, formalities and structure of those judicial pre-decision 
materials the construction of which was among the tasks of Kleist as an employee of the 
chamber of treasury of Königsberg.8 Thus, the patterns of codified Prussian law often 
served as organizing principles in the stories of the oeuvre, from the relentless efforts at 
precision resulting in strict stylistic and editorial consequences to the kleistian sentence 
structures.
The language use and formalities of the contemporary Russian criminal process (with 
regards to which Dostoyevsky talked directly of his opinion and ideas in A Writer’s Diary9) 
have a central role in several novels of Dostoyevsky–especially in The Brothers Karamazov. 
In the trial act the narration becomes rather repetitive–thus evoking the repetition that is 
present with regards to the same events in the witness statements, trial records, and 
summaries prepared by the judge. Moreover, the structure and text of the novel presents the 
same problems–and thus forces the reader to face these–, which could and still cannot be 
solved satisfactorily by legal scholarship, namely the difficulties relating to the narration of 
past events (stories) and the possibilities of reconstruction with regards to the conscience of 
the free-willed subject in the modern era.10
In Franz Kafka’s case–whose story, The Stoker can also be seen as a sort of Kleist- 
paraphrase and therefore it is a remarkable piece of that “exciting intertextual tangle”11 that 
becomes Péter Hajnóczy’s The Stoker in Hungarian literature12–, not only his interest in the 
    8 See Ziolkowski, T.: The Mirror of Justice: Literary Reflections of Legal Crisis. Princeton 
(NJ), 1997. 194–214.
    9 See Murav, H.: Russia’s Legal Fictions. Ann Arbor (MI), 1998. 125–155. 
10 Did everything happen the way the novel originally narrates or in some other way, like how–
in the course of the trial–the lawyers approach it and record it, with their own perspectives and 
notions? As Richard Weisberg says “the lawyers ‘create’ Dmitri, they create the motives for the crime, 
they create the ‘history of a family’”. What is the relationship between the two stories, between 
“reality” and narrated reality, between a man and his intentions and the creature constructed by the 
lawyers’ notions and his will or consciousness? Dostoyevsky’s text foretells the questions of legal 
realism, contemporary cognitive psychological studies and narrative jurisprudence. See Weisberg, R.: 
The Codification of Western Law and The Poethics of Disclosure. Cardozo Studies in L. and 
Literature, 6 (1994) 157; Guthrie, C.–Rachlinski, J. J.–Wistrich, A. J.: Inside The Judicial Mind. 
Cornell Law Review, 86 (2001) 777; Nagy, T.: Narratív tematika a kortárs amerikai jogelméletben. 
[Narrativity in contemporary American jurisprudence.] Acta Universitatis Szegediensis, Acta Juridica 
et Politica, Tomus LXIII., Fasc. 15., Szeged, 2003.
11 Cserjés, K.: Da capo al fine. Hajnóczy Péter egy hátrahagyott novellájáról. [Da capo al fine. A 
short story by Péter Hajnóczy from the bequest.] Tiszatáj, 57 (2003) 5, 113–123.
12 It is my conviction that the impact of the textual world, the language use–its style, expressions, 
sentence structure, narrative techniques, structure etc.–of certain documents of the law and 
jurisprudence of Hungarian socialism on Hajnóczy’s treatment of text is definitely more pronounced 
than what has been established by the secondary literature referring to the life-work so far. Perhaps it 
was János Marno, another writer, who had the most precise feeling with regard to the direct 
relationship between the texts. “A police report, a document relating to the author’s first difficult 
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era’s legal debates can be documented (and placed in the context of the penal reform 
debates of the dying monarchy present in In the Penal Colony or The Trial), but it is clear 
that one of the main points of reference and intertexts for The Trial is the Strafgesetz of 
1852.13 What’s more: the fact that in a secular world the now not originally sinful man’s 
anthropological status includes the presumption of innocence, and thus becomes a part of 
the contemporary reader’s horizon of expectations, and how this fact in turn affects the 
aesthetic impact of the novel would deserve an independent analysis, just like the question 
as to how much the “threat that oozes from the kafkian sentence structure”14 could be lead 
back to the text and narrative technique of bureaucracy and law–and doing this without 
dislodging Kafka from the domain of aesthetics and without fulfilling the purpose of 
kafkology–“replacing Kafka with the Kafkologized Kafka”15–under the burden of the curse 
of Kundera.
In sum: the intertextual signs and references–direct or indirect, that is, through the 
works of other authors–found in literary texts often lead the reader to the textual world of 
the law. This of course does not mean that by reading a literary work read through the 
lenses of law–in the spirit of the “violent” nature and “meaning-killer” practice of law16–we 
wish to exclusively concentrate on the meaning in terms of the law. The intention is just the 
opposite and aims to find such new interpretations that by reading together the legal and 
literary text–a synoptic approach, if you like–could enrich the number of possible 
interpretations as well as our literary and legal knowledge.
The aversion and distance of the legal science can also be explained, nevertheless I do 
not find this approach of mainstream jurisprudence to literature neither wise, nor defendable.
In the United States, ever since its birth with Langdell, the principle aim of legal 
science and legal theory, a discipline that became independent and thus respectable rather 
late and only following a lengthy struggle, has always been the connection to and possible 
influence of the professional legal practice, the actual jurisdiction: in other words, to 
establish a position, a framework, in which, as “the legislation of legislation and the court 
incident with the Kádár-regime, from 1964. Well, the ‘language’, concise ‘style’ of this official report 
describes, evokes the incident with an infernal humor against which reason basically cannot compete 
[...]. The heroic text formation of Hajnóczy [...] confronts with the ‘psycho-social demons’ of both the 
external nivellation and the internal deconstruction, destruction, by ‘following’ their strategy and 
playing on their tone. (Let me add that he could never surpass the ‘level’ of the police report)”. 
Marno, J.: Amióta most már egyre inkább [Ever since it’s been more indeed]. Hitel, 3 (1990) 5, 56–
57. As–let me add yet another example–István Örkény never wrote anything “better” than the text of a 
police document that bears the title Jelentés Örkény István író gépkocsi vezetői engedélyéről [Report 
on writer István Örkény’s driving license], dated 3rd November 1959, Budapest. Rubicon, 16 (2004) 
8–9, 76. Furthermore, I am also convinced that on the texts of countless literary works from the era of 
socialism in the former Soviet Bloc countries basicly the same impact could be detected.
13 See Ziolkowski, T.: op. cit. 214–240, and ʻFranz Kafka: The Trial’. In: Dimensions of the 
Modern Novels: German Texts and European Contexts. Princeton (NJ), 1969. 37–67. Furthermore: 
Nagy, T.: “A per” mint burleszk, avagy releváns kontextus-e az Osztrák-Magyar büntetőjog? [‘The 
Trial’ as burlesque or is Austro-Hungarian criminal law a relevant context?] In: Mezey, B. (ed.): Jogi 
kultúrák, processzusok, rituálék és szimbólumok [Legal cultures, processes, rituals and symbols]. 
Budapest, 2006. 250–266.
14 Birnbaum, M. D.: Esterházy-Kalauz [Esterházy-Guide]. Budapest, 1991. 156.
15 Kundera: op. cit. 42.
16 See Cover, R.: The Supreme Court 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative. Harvard 
Law Review, 97 (1983) 4. and Violence and the Word. Yale Law Journal, 95 (1985–1986) 1601.
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of courts” the normative and–borrowing on the ideal of natural sciences–the predictive 
features of jurisprudence could succeed.17 Parallel to this endeavor, members of the 
American legal academia seemed to deny that tradition of the legal profession and way of 
thinking in which law and literature were inseparably intertwined and that was called by 
Robert A. Ferguson the “configuration of law and letters”.18 The denial of the heritage of 
the American enlightenment–partly as a counter-effect of the tradition’s strength–brought 
with itself the abandonment of the viewpoints of literature (and humanities in general) and 
the relevant theoretical reflection.19 The interdisciplinary turn20 of American legal theory in 
the 1960s did not change this scenario in any meaningful way: from among the numerous 
“law and …” trends–despite all their institutional popularity (meaning: within the academia 
and especially the elite universities)–only the economic analysis of the law (“law and 
economics”), with its quasi natural science-like and seemingly objective probings, could 
reach acceptance.21 But if we look at legal science as a whole, the dominance of the late 
19th century ideals and goals (autonomy and commitment to practice) and their tradition, 
together with a dominance of constitutional legal themes and doctrinal analysis, is still 
prevalent, despite the fact that a langdellian ‘dream come true’ becomes more and more 
obviously illusory and impossible.22
17 See for example Schlag, P.: Normativity and the Politics of Form. In: Schlag, P.– Campos, P. 
F.– Smith, S. D.: Against the Law. Durham and London, 1996. 29–99. Richard Posner is even more 
stern in his criticism of the representatives of American jurisprudence, calling them a bunch of 
“kibitzers and scolds”. Posner, R.: The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory. Cambridge (MA), 
1999. 194.
18 Ferguson, R. A.: Law and Letters in American Culture. Cambridge (MA), 1984. Nagy, T.: Jog 
és irodalom: kezdetek és eszmények. [Law and literature: beginnings and ideals.] Iustum Aequum 
Salutare, 3 (2007) 2, 57–69. 
19 Certain exceptions aside. With a different emphasis and in different ways, but the following 
authors also establish a connection between law and literature–and with the same breath, between the 
American enlightenment and modern “law and literature” research: Wigmore, J.: List of Legal Novels. 
Illinois Law Review, 2 (1908), 574; Cardozo, B. N.: Law and Literature. In: Law and literature and 
other essays and addresses. New York, 1931. 3–52; Fuller, L. L.: The Case of the Speluncean 
Explorers. Harvard Law Review, 62 (1949) 616.
20 See Posner, R: The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline. 1962–1987. Harvard Law 
Review, 100 (1987), 761.
21 Moreover: the objectives of interdisciplinary approaches are not always that clear either. 
Perhaps the most obvious example of this is the posnerian program of “law and literature”, in which 
the author seemingly joins one movement, but in such a way that it is at the same time an attempt at a 
destructive criticism of the very same approach, and–as a latent function of his dissertation–he 
attempts to realize objectives that stand in clear opposition to the original intentions of these studies, 
namely the defense of the autonomy of law and legal science (and also the safeguarding of the 
hegemonic position of the economic analysis of law in the world of interdisciplinarity). See also 
Balkin, J. M.: The Domestication of Law and Literature. Law and Social Inquiry, 14 (1989), 787; 
Nagy, T.: Néhány eljárás: Kafka-olvasatok a jogirodalomban [A few processes. Kafka-readings in 
jurisprudence]. In: Josef K. nyomában (–jogról és irodalomról–) [The path of Josef K. (–on law and 
literature–)]. Máriabesnyő–Gödöllő, 2010. 85–121.
22 Schlag, P.: Normative and Nowhere to Go. In: Laying Down the Law: Mysticism, Fetishism, 
and the American Legal Mind. New York–London, 1996. 17–41, and The Evaluation Controversy. Id. 
at 60–76.
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As for modern continental legal science–mainly as the result of the heritage of Roman 
law and German legal science–, it has always been dominated by the dogmatic analysis of 
statutory law with special regards to the conceptual-analyst and concept-constructionist 
procedures that revive some of the 19th century traditions (and the inherent views about the 
aims of jurisprudence and the role of legal academics) of the pandectists.23 Neither these 
actions of the legal science, nor the major trends of contemporary European legal theory 
(legal positivism, the Anglosaxon analytical legal philosophy, or the socio-legal [system] 
theories) do not provide an adequate opportunity to explore the mutual relationship between 
legal and literary texts. The difference and separateness of law and literature (and the arts in 
general) is most heavily emphasized by those theories that build on a socio-theoretical basis 
and that distinguish functional difference as the primary feature of contemporary societies: 
they show two entirely separate field of social activity, and any relationship between the 
two can/should only be characterized by “presupposing their existential-functional 
difference”.24
To present such a relationship pattern as the “one and only” not only covers up the 
elementary mutual dependence of law and narrative(s), explored by Robert Cover in his 
influential essay,25 as well as the fact that legal activity–just like literary activity–is primarily 
an effort to create, explain, and often manipulate texts and the stories they tell, it also leaves 
in the shade that legal and literary texts–starting from the Bible and several other documents 
from antiquity, through Cicero, and then two thousand years later the orations of Daniel 
Webster and the decisions of the Supreme Court, the works of Kleist, Dostoyevsky, Kafka 
or Hajnóczy–are all parts of a text universe the pieces of which are in constant interaction 
and dialogue with each other.26
23 This is of course a simplification, but it does not touch the subject of this writing in substance. 
The same goes for defining “legal dogmatics” as a decidedly practical activity. For the problems with 
regards to the definition of the notion and territory of “legal dogmatics”, see Szabó, M. (ed.): 
Jogdogmatika és jogelmélet [Legal dogmatics and legal theory]. Miskolc, 2007.
24 This viewpoint–starting from the “reflected difference-experience”–is stated in: Cs. Kiss, L.: 
Megjegyzések a jog és a művészet viszonyához.  [Notes on the connections between law and the arts]. 
Iustum Aequum Salutare, 3 (2007) 2, 13–18. I believe that Cs. Kiss’ questions–reflecting his doubts–
do not touch the studies of the intertextual relations between law and literature. If to answer the 
question as to what kind of products can either law or literature provide through its own function-
specific operation for the other as a playing field of legitimate examination, then the answer is simple: 
texts. 
25 Cover, R.: op. cit. 
26 Not to mention that: the texts of the law and especially the texts of court decisions are 
evidently of an intertextual or more precisely, of an hypertextual nature: they become one from stories 
narrated by witness statements, the texts of high court decisions (themselves hypertextual) and the 
commentaries of statutes and relevant commentaries. The concept of hypertextuality is applied to 
literary works by Genette, but I do not see why it could not be used with regards to legal texts as well. 
He talks of a textual relationship in the framework of which the derivation from hypotext to hypertext 
is both forceful (an entire B work comes from an entire A work) and–more or less–officially admitted. 
What hypotext is in literature, the same is the text of the precedent and/or the statute in the textual 
universe of the law, and the decision later on is the hypertext. See Genette, G.: Transztextualitás 
[Transtextuality]. Trans. Burján, M. Helikon, 42 (1996) 1–2, 82–90. Attila József was correct when he 
stated–the law: fabric. Whether it is “always bursting apart somewhere” or not. And this is how the 
poet becomes once again: the unacknowledged legislator of the world.
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The analysis of this interaction and dialogue could mostly be the territory of law and 
literature studies, but it seems, first, that this has only been a partial success so far, and 
second, that they have not managed to break through the ideas regarding the disciplinary 
separation of jurisprudence–and to a large extent, they have themselves to blame.
Besides struggling with the general problems of interdisciplinary studies, they are 
often stuck–as Jane B. Baron remarks27–with the same analytical scheme, which in most 
cases ends up being nothing more than a summary of the plot and the moral of literary 
works with a legal subject, providing a long line of obsolete or obsolete-prone 
interpretations. Moreover, not even these research efforts–despite the fact that the experience 
of marginalization is a constant reality for them in several forms–, are entirely devoid of a 
gesture of exclusion, generally described–when speaking of interdisciplinary approaches–as 
“colonization” by Jack M. Balkin. One discipline tries to use for its own purposes the 
perspectives, tools and methods of another, without showing real interest in commencing an 
actual dialogue.28 Even legal science and legal theory with an affinity for literature 
approaches the question with an eye to what it is that lawyers can hope from studying 
literature (and its theories),29 but this questioning does not work the other way around–
meaning, what it is that the study of legal texts and through them legal science and 
jurisprudence in general could offer to literary scholars. And I believe that this is one of the 
main reasons why there has been no creative dialogue between the representatives of the 
two fields of research so far,30 and this is also the basis of those viewpoints that–no more 
than three and a half decades after its birth (or renaissance)–talk of the “death of law and 
literature”.31
27 Baron, J. B.: Law, Literature and the Problem of Interdisciplinarity. Yale Law Journal, 108 
(1998) 5, 1059. István H. Szilágyi also talks about this problem in his work on the result of law and 
literature studies. H. Szilágyi, I.: Jog – Irodalom [Law–Literature]. In: Jog – Irodalom [Law–
Literature]. Szeged, 2010. 89–120.
28 Balkin, J. M.: Interdisciplinarity as Colonization. Washington and Lee Law Review, 53 
(1996), 949.
29 See also the program-defining study of James Boyd White: White, J. B.: What Can a Lawyer 
Learn From Literature? Harvard Law Review, 102 (1989), 2014.
30 It is an entirely separate issue why most literary scholars–with the exception of Fish, 
Ferguson, James Boyd White and a few other great names–do not discover on their own the 
examination of the texts of the law as a possible area of interdisciplinary studies, but I believe that the 
dialogue should be commenced by lawyers, primarily because it seems that from this side of the field 
the evidence of the frequent contact between the two bodies of text is more visible, as the legal texts 
have always been more specific and aimed at a particular meaning, and especially in the era of 
modernity literary texts “absorb” the legal ones or play on them and it’s not the other way around (as 
opposed to the Bible, for instance, where the religious-literary text included the legal one).
31 Heald, P. J.: The Death Of Law and Literature: An Optimistic Eulogy. The Comparatist, 33 
(2009), 20. Adding that I deeply disagree with Heald’s–in this part optimistic–final conclusion (as 
well as other conclusions he makes in his work) that law and literature studies can only have a future 
of any note if the main product of these studies is the application of their moral interpretations of 
literary works in real life legal decision-making. 
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2. So what?–a short program speech–
“He spoke. And drank rapidly a glass of water”
E. E. Cummings32
It could be different. There have been several initiatives–partly conceived as intertextual in 
their nature–that, if continued, could deepen the dialogue between the two disciplines. 
Besides the approaches applied by Robert Cover and Robert A. Ferguson–which explore 
the interaction and interdependence between law and narrated stories, and legal and literary 
activity and thought process–the research of Theodore Ziolkowski is one that manages to 
successfully combine the perspectives of the history of law and literature, sociology of law 
and literature and theory of law and literature, mixing it with observations of the history of 
ideas, thus opening the possibility for all the representatives of these research areas to get 
involved in the discourse. Ziolowski examines, in essence, how the connection between law 
and literature arches through historic times, with special regard to those in which law 
entered a crisis to some extent or reached a turning point, and how this reflects in the 
literary works of the era, from ancient tragedies and eposes through the Icelandic sagas, the 
medieval German and French fables and the Elizabethan English dramas to the 19th–20th 
century novel. What really matters from all this–with respect to the objectives of the present 
writing–is this: the process. Ziolkowski’s interpretations are of a double nature: first, as the 
reality-referential interpretations of the literary works of a certain era, they show how 
contemporary literary works present the dilemmas of the legal life–its historic practice and 
theory–of the era in question; second, searching for textual proofs–and finding these–they 
prove that the era’s legal texts did indeed shape the text of these works. So: on the one 
hand–in the spirit of referentiality–we can find the fundamentals of such historical legal and 
literary sociological examinations that can be built on by legal historians, legal sociologists 
and legal theorists; on the other hand we can witness such an intertextual investigation that 
may be practiced by literary scholars as well.33
I find similarly double-natured those examinations–or more precisely: the possibilities 
therein–that form a part of socio-legal document-analysis executed by the sociology of law. 
Document-analysis–be it legal or non-legal documents, as in the case of the latter, literary 
works, press news and court reports, a product of the fine arts, films, or other products of 
popular culture34 (for instance, song lyrics)35–as a part of legal sociology examines primarily 
32 E. E. Cummings: “next to of course god america i”. In: Complete Poems 1904–1962. New 
York (NY), 1994. 267.
33 Ziolkowski does not detail this in the same way, but I find that his analysis follows a similar 
pattern. The German comparatist author finds his own research in subject-matter to be similar to “law 
and literature” studies, but with regards to emphasis and objectives (in part) to be different and uses 
the “literature and law” denomination for those. With regards to difference in emphasis, he remarks 
that his approach is much more historic than theoretical, and he does not wish to read the dilemmas of 
neither the modern legal practice, nor the contemporary theory of law into the works of long gone 
times. His objective is to reconstruct the original legal, legal and socio-historic context of the studied 
literary works. Thus: his interest is “more substantive than rhetoric” in nature, with special attention 
paid to the traces of confrontations and conflicts between contemporary law and morals. Ziolkowski, 
T.: The Mirror of Justice: Literary Reflections of Legal Crisis. Note 8 above, xi–xii.
34 Sherwin, R. K.: When Law Goes Pop. Chicago–London, 2000. 
35 For example: Armstrong, E. G.: Gangsta Misogyny: A Content Analysis of the Portrayals of 
Violence Against Women in Rap Music, 1987–1993. Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular 
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the reality-relevance of the above-mentioned, that is, what kind of image they broadcast of 
law, jurisprudence, the legal profession or the perceptions members of society harbor with 
regards to these.36 Nothing forecloses, however, the possibility that these analyses could 
from time to time become intertextual in nature: in other words–now applying the 
experiences of sociolinguistics and the sociology of language37–by reading together legal 
and literary texts they can study and show us how society affects language (analogously the 
legal and the literary language) and the language use of its members, or how language (in 
this case: the mutually influential legal and literary language) affects society.
Conclusion–even shorter
So: to establish mutual contact between the legal and literary sciences, the partial 
rehabilitation of the referential interpretations of relevant literary works is not the single 
option. The–for the moment–dominant trends of contemporary literary thinking seem 
capable of being in sync more easily with those jurisprudential examinations that start off 
on the path of intertextuality, that is, consider as their primary task the exploration of the 
connections and specific forms of such connections of those legal and literary works that 
influence one another. The obvious purpose of these studies is to make sure that lawyers 
could also provide important lessons for literary scholars, and thus make the interest (once 
again) mutual and make the present dialogue more intensive between the advocates of the 
two fields. This would be the kind of dialogue that is well deserved by the historic 
connection between law and literature.
Culture, 8 (2001) 2, 96–126.
36 Based on Jean Carbonnier’s work, a summary in Hungarian language of these studies can be 
found in Zombor, F.: Dokumentumelemzés [Document-analysis]. In: Badó, A. et al.: Bevezetés a 
jogszociológiába [Introduction to the sociology of law]. Miskolc, 1997. 99–112., and H. Szilágyi: op. 
cit. 99–100.
37 See Kiss, J.: Társadalom és nyelvhasználat. Szociolingvisztikai alapfogalmak [Society and 
Use of Language. Socio-linguistic premises]. Budapest, 2002; Wardhaugh, R.: Introduction to 
Sociolinguistics. Oxford, 1997. On an added note: for these types of socio-legal documentary analysis 
I find it important that they should dispose of a literary approach that is at least compatible with the 
perspectives of contemporary literary studies; and they should leave the magic circle of the romantic 
genius aesthetics, in which writers and poets are portrayed as seers and prophets, as geniuses, who 
grab the “matter at hand” with the “instinctiveness of poetic geniality”. The origins of exceptional 
linguistic competencies are of course impossible to explain, but Dickens and Kafka (and the others as 
well) were professionals. See also Zombor, F.: op. cit. 110.
